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Citation (1862) EWHC CP J35 Court Court of Common Pleas, England Date of Judgment 12 January 1862 Bench Hon’ble Justice Willes, Hon’ble Justice Keating Facts of the Case The case arose from a dispute between Felthouse, an uncle, and Bindley, an auctioneer. Felthouse had written to his nephew expressing his intention to buy a horse for £30, adding that if he did not hear anything further, he would consider the horse his. The nephew did not explicitly reply to this communication but instructed Bindley, the auctioneer, not to sell the horse as it was meant for his uncle. However, Bindley mistakenly sold the horse at an auction. Felthouse sued Bindley for conversion, claiming ownership of the horse. The central issue was whether the uncle’s statement, combined with the nephew’s silence, constituted a valid acceptance, thereby forming a contract of sale. Legal Issues Can silence constitute acceptance of an offer in contract law? Was there a valid contract of sale between Felthouse and his nephew? Reasoning of the Court Silence as Acceptance The court held that silence cannot constitute acceptance. An offer must be explicitly accepted through communication or conduct to form a valid contract. The nephew’s lack of reply could not be interpreted as consent to the terms of the offer. No Meeting of Minds (Consensus Ad Idem) The court emphasized the importance of consensus ad idem—a meeting of minds between the parties. In this case, the nephew’s failure to explicitly accept the offer indicated a lack of agreement. Role of Conduct Although the nephew had instructed the auctioneer not to sell the horse, this action alone was insufficient to establish a binding contract, as it did not amount to clear communication of acceptance to Felthouse. Judgment The Court of Common Pleas ruled in favor of Bindley. It held that no valid contract existed between Felthouse and his nephew as acceptance cannot be inferred from silence. Significance of the Case Key Principle of Acceptance The case established the foundational rule that acceptance must be clearly communicated to the offeror to form a valid contract. Protecting Contractual Freedom It reinforced the principle that individuals cannot be bound to contractual obligations through silence or inactivity. Modern Application This case is widely cited to distinguish between implied conduct and explicit acceptance in contract formation, ensuring clarity in commercial and personal transactions. Conclusion The case of Felthouse v. Bindley remains a cornerstone of contract law, underscoring the necessity of clear acceptancefor a valid contract. It highlights the protection of parties from unintended obligations and ensures fairness in contractual dealings.

Citation AIR 1966 SC 543 Court Supreme Court of India Date of Judgment 22 November 1965 Bench Hon’ble Justice J.C. Shah, Hon’ble Justice K. Subba Rao, Hon’ble Justice R.S. Bachawat Facts of the Case Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia, the appellant, conducted business in Hyderabad, and Girdharilal Parshottamdas & Co., the respondent, operated in Ahmedabad. The two parties communicated through a telephone conversation, during which Bhagwandas agreed to sell cotton seed cakes to Girdharilal. The appellant failed to deliver the agreed goods, prompting the respondent to sue for breach of contract. The key issue in the case was to determine where the contract was concluded—in Hyderabad, where the offer was made, or in Ahmedabad, where the acceptance was communicated. Legal Issues Where was the contract formed—the place of offer or the place of acceptance? Does communication through instantaneous means (telephone) differ from traditional postal communication in determining the location of contract formation? Reasoning of the Court Communication Through Instantaneous Means The Supreme Court held that contracts made via instantaneous means, such as a telephone, are formed at the place where the acceptance is heard by the offeror. Place of Contract Formation The court ruled that the contract was concluded in Hyderabad, where the appellant heard the respondent’s acceptance. Unlike postal communication, telephone communication involves instantaneous delivery of acceptance, making the place of hearing the decisive factor. Objective of Contractual Rules The court emphasized that rules regarding contract formation should ensure clarity and certainty in commercial transactions. The principle of acceptance being effective upon hearing ensures a logical and fair outcome. Judgment The Supreme Court ruled that the contract was formed in Hyderabad, where the acceptance was heard. The court emphasized the distinction between contracts formed through postal communication and those formed through instantaneous means, establishing a precedent for the latter. Significance of the Case Precedent for Instantaneous Communication This case established the principle that in contracts formed through instantaneous means, the place of hearing acceptance determines where the contract is concluded. Clarity in Commercial Transactions The judgment provided much-needed clarity for businesses engaging in cross-border or inter-state transactions involving modern communication methods. Evolution of Contract Law The case reflects the adaptability of contract law to evolving communication technologies, ensuring the relevance of legal principles in a dynamic commercial landscape. Conclusion The case of Bhagwandas Goverdhandas Kedia v. Girdharilal Parshottamdas & Co. is a landmark judgment that addressed the impact of instantaneous communication on contract formation. It reinforced the importance of defining the location of contract formation to avoid disputes in commercial dealings.

Citation [1893] AC 552 Court Privy Council Date of Judgment 23 May 1893 Bench Lord Morris, Lord Watson, Lord Macnaghten, Lord Shand, Lord Davey Facts of the Case The case involved a dispute over the sale of property in Jamaica. Harvey sent a telegram to Facey, stating: “Will you sell us Bumper Hall Pen? Telegraph lowest cash price.” Facey replied: “Lowest price for Bumper Hall Pen £900.” Harvey then sent another telegram agreeing to buy the property for £900, but Facey refused to sell. Harvey sued, claiming that Facey’s response to the first telegram constituted an offer and his subsequent reply was an acceptance, thereby forming a valid contract. Legal Issues Whether Facey’s response constituted a legal offer. Whether there was a valid acceptance leading to the formation of a contract. Reasoning of the Court Offer vs. Invitation to Treat The court held that Facey’s response to Harvey’s inquiry was merely a statement of the lowest price he would accept for the property. It was not an offer capable of being accepted. No Meeting of Minds (Consensus Ad Idem) There was no intention to create legal relations or evidence of a concluded agreement. The exchange lacked the essential element of a definitive offer and acceptance. Communication and Clarity The court emphasized that a mere statement of price in response to a query does not constitute a binding offer unless accompanied by a clear intention to sell. Judgment The Privy Council ruled in favor of Facey. It held that no contract had been formed as Facey’s reply was not an offer but an invitation to treat. Harvey’s acceptance, therefore, did not create any legal obligations. Significance of the Case Distinction Between Offer and Invitation to Treat This case is a leading authority on the distinction between a legal offer and an invitation to treat, a fundamental concept in contract law. Clarification of Intent It reinforced the principle that a contract cannot arise from ambiguous communication that lacks a definitive offer and acceptance. Applicability in Modern Law The ruling is widely cited in cases involving preliminary negotiations and statements of price, ensuring clarity in contractual communications. Conclusion The case of Harvey v. Facey is a landmark judgment that clarified the distinction between an offer and an invitation to treat. It established that a statement of price does not amount to an offer unless accompanied by an explicit intent to create legal relations.

Citation (1913) ILR 40 All 489 Court Allahabad High Court Date of Judgment 17 December 1913 Bench Hon’ble Justice Banerji Facts of the Case Gauri Dutt sent his servant, Lalman Shukla, to search for his missing nephew. Later, Gauri Dutt announced a reward for anyone who found the boy. Lalman Shukla successfully located and brought back the boy but was unaware of the announced reward at the time of the search. When Lalman Shukla later learned about the reward, he demanded the amount from Gauri Dutt. Gauri Dutt refused to pay, arguing that Lalman Shukla had performed the task without knowledge of the offer. Lalman Shukla sued Gauri Dutt for the reward. Legal Issues Whether an offer can be accepted without knowledge of it. Whether Lalman Shukla’s act of finding the boy constituted acceptance of the offer. Reasoning of the Court Knowledge of the Offer The court held that knowledge of the offer is essential to accept it. A person cannot claim a reward or enforce an offer if they are unaware of it at the time of performing the act. No Meeting of Minds (Consensus Ad Idem) The court observed that there was no consensus ad idem (meeting of minds) between Lalman Shukla and Gauri Dutt at the time of the performance. Lalman Shukla acted as part of his duty as a servant and not in response to the offer. Contractual Intention Since Lalman Shukla was performing his existing duty, there was no intention to create legal relations, and thus, no enforceable contract was formed. Judgment The Allahabad High Court dismissed Lalman Shukla’s claim and held that he was not entitled to the reward. The court ruled that knowledge of the offer is a prerequisite for forming a valid contract. Since Lalman Shukla was unaware of the reward at the time of his act, there was no acceptance of the offer. Significance of the Case Essentials of Acceptance This case clarified that knowledge of the offer is an essential component of acceptance in contract law. No Contract Without Intent It established that performing a duty without awareness of an offer does not constitute acceptance, even if the act aligns with the offer’s terms. Application in Modern Law The principles laid down in this case are widely cited to highlight the importance of intention and awareness in forming contracts. Conclusion The case of Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Dutt underscores the importance of knowledge and intention in contract formation. It remains a seminal judgment in Indian contract law, emphasizing that a reward or offer cannot be enforced without prior awareness and explicit acceptance.

Citation (1903) 30 Cal 539 (Privy Council) Court Privy Council Date of Judgment 4 July 1903 Bench Lord Macnaghten, Lord Lindley, Lord Davey Facts of the Case Dharmodas Ghose, a minor, mortgaged his property to Brahmo Dutt, a moneylender, to secure a loan of Rs. 20,000. At the time of executing the mortgage deed, Dharmodas was underage, and this fact was known to the moneylender’s agent. Dharmodas only received Rs. 8,000 from the loan and later sued to have the mortgage set aside, claiming that he was a minor at the time and, therefore, the contract was void. The moneylender argued that the contract was valid and sought enforcement of the mortgage. Legal Issues Whether a minor’s agreement is void or voidable under Indian contract law. Whether a party who has advanced money under a void agreement can seek compensation or restitution. Reasoning of the Court Nature of a Minor’s Agreement The court held that, under Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, a minor is not competent to contract. Hence, any agreement entered into by a minor is void ab initio (void from the beginning). No Estoppel Against a Minor The court rejected the moneylender’s claim that Dharmodas was estopped from denying his ability to contract. A minor cannot be estopped from asserting their incapacity to contract. Restitution Under Void Contracts The court observed that Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act, which deals with restitution, applies only to agreements that are voidable, not those that are void ab initio. Since the contract was void, there was no question of restitution. Judgment The Privy Council ruled in favor of Dharmodas Ghose, declaring the mortgage void. The court held that a minor’s agreement is void and cannot be enforced by the other party. Furthermore, the moneylender was not entitled to any compensation or restitution for the loan advanced. Significance of the Case Foundational Principle This case firmly established that any agreement entered into by a minor is void ab initio, setting a precedent in Indian contract law. Protection of Minors The judgment reinforced the principle of protecting minors from exploitation and unfair contracts. Restitution Clarification The case clarified that Section 65 of the Indian Contract Act does not apply to agreements void from inception. Conclusion The case of Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose is a landmark judgment that continues to guide contract law, particularly regarding the competency of parties to contract. It ensures that minors are shielded from the consequences of agreements they are not legally capable of entering.

Citation [1893] 1 QB 256 Court Court of Appeal, England Date of Judgment 7 December 1892 Bench Hon’ble Lord Justice Lindley, Hon’ble Lord Justice Bowen, Hon’ble Lord Justice Smith Facts of the Case The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company manufactured a product called the “smoke ball,” which was claimed to prevent influenza and other diseases. The company ran an advertisement promising £100 to anyone who used the smoke ball as directed and still contracted influenza. To show their seriousness, the company stated they had deposited £1,000 in a bank as proof of their intent. Mrs. Carlill, relying on the advertisement, purchased and used the smoke ball as instructed but still contracted influenza. She sued the company for the promised £100 reward. The company argued that the advertisement was not intended to create legal relations and that Mrs. Carlill’s use of the product did not constitute an acceptance of their offer. Legal Issues Whether the advertisement constituted a valid offer under contract law. Whether Mrs. Carlill’s actions amounted to acceptance of the offer. Whether there was an intention to create legal relations. Reasoning of the Court Unilateral Offer The court held that the advertisement constituted a valid unilateral offer to the public. A unilateral offer does not require prior communication of acceptance; performance of the conditions mentioned in the offer suffices. Acceptance by Conduct Mrs. Carlill’s compliance with the advertised conditions (using the smoke ball as directed) was deemed an acceptance of the offer. Intention to Create Legal Relations The company’s deposit of £1,000 in the bank was viewed as evidence of their seriousness and intention to create legal obligations. Specificity of the Advertisement The court rejected the company’s argument that the advertisement was too vague to constitute a binding contract. The conditions were clearly defined, making the offer enforceable. Judgment The Court of Appeal ruled in favor of Mrs. Carlill. It held that the advertisement constituted a valid and enforceable contract. The company was ordered to pay Mrs. Carlill the promised £100. Significance of the Case Foundation of Unilateral Contracts The case established the principle that a public advertisement can constitute a unilateral offer if it is clear, specific, and leaves no ambiguity about the conditions of acceptance. Acceptance without Notification It clarified that in unilateral contracts, acceptance can be achieved through performance without the need to notify the offeror. Intent to Create Legal Relations The judgment reinforced the importance of objective evidence (like the deposit of money) to establish an intention to create legal obligations. Conclusion The case of Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. is a landmark decision that continues to influence contract law globally. It illustrates the enforceability of unilateral contracts and the principles of offer, acceptance, and intention in contract formation.

Citation [1919] 2 KB 571 Court Court of Appeal, England Date of Judgment 25 June 1919 Bench Hon’ble Justice Warrington, Hon’ble Justice Duke, Hon’ble Justice Atkin Facts of the Case Mr. and Mrs. Balfour were a married couple living in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). Mr. Balfour, a government officer, returned to England on leave, while Mrs. Balfour stayed back due to health issues. Before leaving, Mr. Balfour promised to pay Mrs. Balfour £30 per month as maintenance during their separation. Subsequently, their relationship soured, and Mr. Balfour ceased making payments. Mrs. Balfour sued for breach of contract, contending that their agreement was legally enforceable. Legal Issues Whether an agreement between spouses for maintenance can constitute a legally enforceable contract. Whether the absence of an intention to create legal relations renders such agreements void. Reasoning of the Court Nature of Domestic Agreements The court ruled that agreements between spouses, especially those related to household matters, are typically domestic in nature and do not carry an intention to create legal relations. Intention to Create Legal Relations Justice Atkin emphasized that an intention to create legal obligations is a fundamental requirement for any contract. In this case, the agreement lacked this intention. Public Policy Justice Atkin also noted that enforcing such domestic arrangements would unnecessarily entangle the courts in personal relationships, which is contrary to public policy. Judgment The Court of Appeal held that the agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Balfour was not legally enforceable because it lacked the requisite intention to create legal relations. Therefore, Mrs. Balfour’s claim was dismissed. Significance of the Case Key Principle Established The case established that domestic or social agreements are presumed not to have an intention to create legal relations unless explicitly stated otherwise. Impact on Contract Law The judgment clarified the boundaries of enforceable agreements, emphasizing the critical role of legal intent in contract formation. Guidance for Future Cases This principle has since been consistently applied to distinguish between social and legally binding agreements. Conclusion The case of Balfour v. Balfour remains a cornerstone of contract law, illustrating the importance of legal intention in determining the enforceability of agreements. It draws a clear distinction between social arrangements and contracts, thereby safeguarding the sanctity of personal relationships from unwarranted legal interference.

Section 20 elaborates on the impact of acknowledgment or payment made by someone other than the person against whom the right is claimed on the limitation period. Key Points: 1. Acknowledgment by Agent or Legal Representative: An acknowledgment or part payment made by an agent duly authorized by the debtor or by a legal representative of the deceased debtor has the same effect as if made by the debtor themselves. This extends the limitation period similarly as if the acknowledgment or payment were made by the person liable. 2. Payment by Third Party: If a third party makes the payment on behalf of the debtor, it must be clear that the payment is intended to be towards the discharge of the debtor’s liability. The payment should be acknowledged as such to have an impact on the limitation period. 3. Joint Debtors: In the case of joint debtors, an acknowledgment or payment by one debtor does not necessarily affect the limitation period for the other debtor(s), unless there is a specific agreement or understanding to that effect. 4. Authorized Acknowledgment: The agent or representative making the acknowledgment must be duly authorized to do so. The acknowledgment should be in writing and signed by the authorized person. 5. Purpose: Section 20 ensures that payments or acknowledgments made by authorized agents or legal representatives are recognized for the purpose of extending the limitation period. It provides clarity and continuity in situations involving payments or acknowledgments by parties other than the principal debtor. 6. Illustration: If A, an agent of B, acknowledges a debt in writing on January 1, 2022, before the limitation period expires on January 1, 2023, the limitation period is reset from January 1, 2022. By detailing these provisions, Sections 18 to 20 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provide clarity on how acknowledgmentsand payments affect the computation of the limitation period, ensuring fairness and flexibility in the enforcement of legal rights.

Section 14 provides for the exclusion of the time spent in legal proceedings conducted in good faith in a court that ultimately lacked jurisdiction. Key Points: 1. Good Faith Proceedings: This section applies to proceedings initiated in good faith in a court that is found to lack jurisdiction, whether over the subject matter or the parties involved. “Good faith” implies that the proceedings were initiated with honest intent and without negligence. 2. Exclusion of Time: The time spent in such bona fide proceedings is excluded when computing the period of limitation for filing a suit, appeal, or application. This includes the entire duration from the commencement of the initial proceeding to its termination. 3. Applicable Situations: The section applies to suits, appeals, and applications that are dismissed on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. It also applies to cases where the proceedings are withdrawn to file in a proper court with jurisdiction. 4. Subsequent Legal Actions: The exclusion of time allows the plaintiff or applicant to initiate subsequent legal action in the correct court without the limitation period being adversely affected by the time spent in the incorrect court. This ensures that genuine mistakes regarding jurisdiction do not bar the right to seek legal redress. 5. Purpose: The purpose of Section 14 is to prevent injustice to parties who, in good faith, have pursued legal remedies in a forum that lacks jurisdiction. It encourages diligent prosecution of claims without penalizing parties for procedural errors regarding jurisdiction. 6. Illustration: If A files a suit in Court X on January 1, 2020, and the suit is dismissed on December 31, 2020, for lack of jurisdiction, the time spent in Court X is excluded. If the limitation period for the suit is three years, A can file the suit in the correct court, and the time spent from January 1, 2020, to December 31, 2020, will not be counted.